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ABSTRACT
While deep neural networks have proven to be a powerful tool for many recogni-
tion and classification tasks, their stability properties are still not well understood.
In the past, image classifiers have been shown to be vulnerable to so-called adver-
sarial attacks, which are created by additively perturbing the correctly classified
image. In this paper, we propose the ADef algorithm to construct a different
kind of adversarial attack created by iteratively applying small deformations to
the image, found through a gradient descent step. We demonstrate our results on
MNIST with convolutional neural networks and on ImageNet with Inception-v3
and ResNet-101.
1 INTRODUCTION
In a first observation in Szegedy et al. (2013) it was found that deep neural networks exhibit unstable
behavior to small perturbations in the input. For the task of image classification this means that two
visually indistinguishable images may have very different outputs, resulting in one of them being
misclassified even if the other one is correctly classified with high confidence. Since then, a lot
of research has been done to investigate this issue through the construction of adversarial examples:
given a correctly classified image x, we look for an image y which is visually indistinguishable from
x but is misclassified by the network. Typically, the image y is constructed as y = x+ r, where r is
an adversarial perturbation that is supposed to be small in a suitable sense (normally, with respect
to an `p norm). Several algorithms have been developed to construct adversarial perturbations,
see Goodfellow et al. (2014); Moosavi Dezfooli et al. (2016); Kurakin et al. (2017b); Madry et al.
(2018); Carlini & Wagner (2017b) and the review paper Akhtar & Mian (2018).
Even though such pathological cases are very unlikely to occur in practice, their existence is relevant
since malicious attackers may exploit this drawback to fool classifiers or other automatic systems.
Further, adversarial perturbations may be constructed in a black-box setting (i.e., without knowing
the architecture of the DNN but only its outputs) (Papernot et al., 2017; Moosavi-Dezfooli et al.,
2017) and also in the physical world (Kurakin et al., 2017b; Athalye & Sutskever, 2017; Brown et al.,
2017; Sharif et al., 2016). This has motivated the investigation of defenses, i.e., how to make the
network invulnerable to such attacks, see Kurakin et al. (2017a); Carlini & Wagner (2017a); Madry
et al. (2018); Trame`r et al. (2018); Wong & Kolter (2018); Raghunathan et al. (2018); Athalye et al.
(2018); Kannan et al. (2018). In most cases, adversarial examples are artificially created and then
used to retrain the network, which becomes more stable under these types of perturbations.
Most of the work on the construction of adversarial examples and on the design of defense strategies
has been conducted in the context of small perturbations r measured in the `∞ norm. However, this
is not necessarily a good measure of image similarity: e.g., for two translated images x and y, the
norm of x−y is not small in general, even though x and y will look indistinguishable if the translation
is small. Several papers have investigated the construction of adversarial perturbations not designed
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for norm proximity (Rozsa et al., 2016; Sharif et al., 2016; Brown et al., 2017; Engstrom et al., 2017;
Xiao et al., 2018).
In this work, we build up on these ideas and investigate the construction of adversarial deformations.
In other words, the misclassified image y is not constructed as an additive perturbation y = x + r,
but as a deformation y = x ◦ (id + τ), where τ is a vector field defining the transformation. In this
case, the similarity is not measured through a norm of y−x, but instead through a norm of τ , which
quantifies the deformation between y and x.
We develop an efficient algorithm for the construction of adversarial deformations, which we call
ADef. It is based on the main ideas of DeepFool (Moosavi Dezfooli et al., 2016), and iteratively
constructs the smallest deformation to misclassify the image. We test the procedure on MNIST
(LeCun) (with convolutional neural networks) and on ImageNet (Russakovsky et al., 2015) (with
Inception-v3 (Szegedy et al., 2016) and ResNet-101 (He et al., 2016)). The results show that ADef
can succesfully fool the classifiers in the vast majority of cases (around 99%) by using very small and
imperceptible deformations. We also test our adversarial attacks on adversarially trained networks
for MNIST. Our implementation of the algorithm can be found at https://gitlab.math.
ethz.ch/tandrig/ADef.
The results of this work have initially appeared in the master’s thesis Gauksson (2017), to which
we refer for additional details on the mathematical aspects of this construction. While writing this
paper, we have come across Xiao et al. (2018), in which a similar problem is considered and solved
with a different algorithm. Whereas in Xiao et al. (2018) the authors use a second order solver to
find a deforming vector field, we show how a first order method can be formulated efficiently and
justify a smoothing operation, independent of the optimization step. We report, for the first time,
success rates for adversarial attacks with deformations on ImageNet. The topic of deformations has
also come up in Jaderberg et al. (2015), in which the authors introduce a class of learnable modules
that deform inputs in order to increase the performance of existing DNNs, and Fawzi & Frossard
(2015), in which the authors introduce a method to measure the invariance of classifiers to geometric
transformations.
2 ADVERSARIAL DEFORMATIONS
2.1 ADVERSARIAL PERTURBATIONS
Let K be a classifier of images consisting of P pixels into L ≥ 2 categories, i.e. a function from the
space of images X = RcP , where c = 1 (for grayscale images) or c = 3 (for color images), and into
the set of labels L = {1, . . . , L}. Suppose x ∈ X is an image that is correctly classified by K and
suppose y ∈ X is another image that is imperceptible from x and such that K(y) 6= K(x), then y is
said to be an adversarial example. The meaning of imperceptibility varies, but generally, proximity
in `p-norm (with 1 ≤ p ≤ ∞) is considered to be a sufficient substitute. Thus, an adversarial
perturbation for an image x ∈ X is a vector r ∈ X such that K(x+ r) 6= K(x) and ‖r‖p is small,
where
‖r‖p =
 cP∑
j=1
|rj |p
1/p if 1 ≤ p <∞, and ‖r‖∞ = maxj=1,...,cP |rj | . (1)
Given such a classifier K and an image x, an adversary may attempt to find an adversarial example
y by minimizing ‖x− y‖p subject to K(y) 6= K(x), or even subject to K(y) = k for some target
label k 6= K(x). Different methods for finding minimal adversarial perturbations have been pro-
posed, most notably FGSM (Goodfellow et al., 2014) and PGD (Madry et al., 2018) for `∞, and the
DeepFool algorithm (Moosavi Dezfooli et al., 2016) for general `p-norms.
2.2 DEFORMATIONS
Instead of constructing adversarial perturbations, we intend to fool the classifier by small deforma-
tions of correctly classified images. Our procedure is in the spirit of the DeepFool algorithm. Before
we explain it, let us first clarify what we mean by a deformation of an image. The discussion is at
first more intuitive if we model images as functions ξ : [0, 1]2 → Rc (with c = 1 or c = 3) instead
2
Published as a conference paper at ICLR 2019
Original
`∞: 1.00
Translation by (−2, 1)
`∞: 0.98
Rotation by 10◦
`∞: 1.00
Deformation w.r.t. τ
T : 2.24 T : 3.33 T : 1.63
Figure 1: First row: The original 28 × 28 pixel image from the MNIST database, and the same
image translated by (−2, 1), rotated by an angle of 10◦, and deformed w.r.t. an arbitrary smooth
vector field τ . The `∞-norm of the corresponding perturbation is shown under each deformed
image. The pixel values range from 0 (white) to 1 (black), so the deformed images all lie far
from the original image in the `∞-norm. Second row: The vector fields corresponding to the above
deformations and their T -norms (cf. equation (3)).
of discrete vectors x in RcP . In this setting, perturbing an image ξ : [0, 1]2 → Rc corresponds to
adding to it another function ρ : [0, 1]2 → Rc with a small Lp-norm.
While any transformation of an image ξ can be written as a perturbation ξ + ρ, we shall restrict
ourselves to a particular class of transformations. A deformation with respect to a vector field
τ : [0, 1]2 → R2 is a transformation of the form ξ 7→ ξτ , where for any image ξ : [0, 1]2 → Rc, the
image ξτ : [0, 1]2 → Rc is defined by
ξτ (u) = ξ (u+ τ(u)) for all u ∈ [0, 1]2,
extending ξ by zero outside of [0, 1]2. Deformations capture many natural image transformations.
For example, a translation of the image ξ by a vector v ∈ R2 is a deformation with respect to the
constant vector field τ = v. If v is small, the images ξ and ξv may look similar, but the corresponding
perturbation ρ = ξv − ξ may be arbitrarily large in the aforementioned Lp-norms. Figure 1 shows
three minor deformations, all of which yield large L∞-norms.
In the discrete setting, deformations are implemented as follows. We consider square images of
W ×W pixels and define the space of images to be X = (RW×W )c. A discrete vector field is a
function τ : {1, . . . ,W}2 → R2. In what follows we will only consider the set T of vector fields
that do not move points on the grid {1, . . . ,W}2 outside of [1,W ]2. More precisely,
T :=
{
τ : {1, . . . ,W}2 → R2 | τ(s, t) + (s, t) ∈ [1,W ]2 for all s, t ∈ {1, . . . ,W}} .
An image x ∈ X can be viewed as the collection of values of a function ξ : [0, 1]2 → Rc on a regular
grid {1/(W+1), . . . ,W/(W+1)}2 ⊆ [0, 1]2, i.e. xs,t = ξ(s/(W+1), t/(W+1)) for s, t = 1, . . . ,W . Such
a function ξ can be computed by interpolating from x. Thus, the deformation of an image x with
respect to the discrete vector field τ can be defined as the discrete deformed image xτ in X by
xτs,t = ξ
(
(s, t) + τ(s, t)
W + 1
)
, s, t ∈ {1, . . . ,W}. (2)
It is not straightforward to measure the size of a deformation such that it captures the visual dif-
ference between the original image x and its deformed counterpart xτ . We will use the size of the
3
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corresponding vector field, τ , in the norm defined by
‖τ‖T = maxs,t=1,...,W ‖τ(s, t)‖2 (3)
as a proxy. The `p-norms defined in (1), adapted to vector fields, can be used as well. (We remark,
however, that none of these norms define a distance between x and xτ , since two vector fields
τ, σ ∈ T with ‖τ‖T 6= ‖σ‖T may produce the same deformed image xτ = xσ .)
2.3 THE ALGORITHM ADEF
We will now describe our procedure for finding deformations that will lead a classifier to yield an
output different from the original label.
Let F = (F1, . . . , FL) : X → RL be the underlying model for the classifier K, such that
K(x) = argmax
k=1,...,L
Fk(x).
Let x ∈ X be the image of interest and fix ξ : [0, 1]2 → Rc obtained by interpolation from x. Let
l = K(x) denote the true label of x, let k ∈ L be a target label and set f = Fk − Fl. We assume
that x does not lie on a decision boundary, so that we have f(x) < 0.
We define the function g : T → R, τ 7→ f(xτ ) and note that g(0) = f(x0) = f(x) < 0. Our goal
is to find a small vector field τ ∈ T such that g(τ) = f(xτ ) ≥ 0. We can use a linear approximation
of g around the zero vector field as a guide:
g(τ) ≈ g(0) + (D0g) τ (4)
for small enough τ ∈ T and D0g : T → R the derivative of g at τ = 0. Hence, if τ is a vector field
such that
(D0g) τ = −g(0) (5)
and ‖τ‖T is small, then the classifier K has approximately equal confidence for the deformed image
xτ to have either label l or k. This is a scalar equation with unknown in T , and so has infinitely
many solutions. In order to select τ with small norm, we solve it in the least-squares sense.
In view of (2), we have ∂x
τ
∂τ |τ=0(s, t) = 1W+1∇ξ
(
(s,t)
W+1
)
∈ Rc×2. Thus, by applying the chain
rule to g(τ) = f(xτ ), we obtain that its derivative at τ = 0 can, with a slight abuse of notation, be
identified with the vector field
D0g(s, t) =
1
W + 1
(∇f(x))
s,t
∇ξ
(
(s, t)
W + 1
)
, (6)
where
(∇f(x))
s,t
∈ R1×c is the derivative of f in x calculated at (s, t). With this, (D0g) τ stands
for
∑W
s,t=1D0g(s, t) · τ(s, t), and the solution to (5) in the least-square sense is given by
τ = − f(x)∑W
s,t=1 |D0g(s, t)|2
D0g. (7)
Finally, we define the deformed image xτ ∈ X according to (2).
One might like to impose some degree of smoothness on the deforming vector field. In fact, it
suffices to search in the range of a smoothing operator S : T → T . However, this essentially
amounts to applying S to the solution from the larger search space T . Let α = S(D0g) = ϕ∗(D0g),
where S denotes the componentwise application of a two-dimensional Gaussian filter ϕ (of any
standard deviation). Then the vector field
τ˜ = − f(x)∑W
s,t=1 |α(s, t)|2
Sα = − f(x)∑W
s,t=1 |α(s, t)|2
S2(D0g)
also satisfies (5), since S is self-adjoint. We can hence replace τ by τ˜ to obtain a smooth deformation
of the image x.
We iterate the deformation process until the deformed image is misclassified. More explicitly, let
x(0) = x and for n ≥ 1 let τ (n) be given by (7) for x(n−1). Then we can define the iteration as
4
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x(n) = x(n−1) ◦ (id+ τ (n)). The algorithm terminates and outputs an adversarial example y = x(n)
if K(x(n)) 6= l. The iteration also terminates if x(n) lies on a decision boundary of K, in which
case we propose to introduce an overshoot factor 1+η on the total deforming vector field. Provided
that the number of iterations is moderate, the total vector field can be well approximated by τ∗ =
τ (1)+· · ·+τ (n) and the process can be altered to output the deformed image y = x◦(id+(1+η)τ∗)
instead.
The target label k may be chosen in each iteration to minimize the vector field to obtain a better
approximation in the linearization (4). More precisely, for a candidate set of labels k1, . . . , km, we
compute the corresponding vectors fields τ1, . . . , τm and select
k = argmin
j=1,...,m
‖τj‖T .
The candidate set consists of the labels corresponding to the indices of the m smallest entries of
F − Fl, in absolute value.
Algorithm ADef
Input: Classification model F , image x, correct label l, candidate labels k1, . . . , km
Output: Deformed image y
Initialize y ← x
while K(y) = l do
for j = 1, . . . ,m do
αj ← S
(∑c
i=1
(
(∇Fkj )i − (∇Fl)i
) · ∇yi)
τj ← −Fkj (y)−Fl(y)‖αj‖2
`2
Sαj
end for
i← argminj=1,...,m ‖τj‖T
y ← y ◦ (id + τi)
end while
return y
By equation (6), provided that ∇f is moderate, the deforming vector field takes small values wher-
ever ξ has a small derivative. This means that the vector field will be concentrated on the edges in
the image x (see e.g. the first row of figure 2). Further, note that the result of a deformation is always
a valid image in the sense that it does not violate the pixel value bounds. This is not guaranteed for
the perturbations computed with DeepFool.
3 EXPERIMENTS
3.1 SETUP
We evaluate the performance of ADef by applying the algorithm to classifiers trained on the MNIST
(LeCun) and ImageNet (Russakovsky et al., 2015) datasets. Below, we briefly describe the setup of
the experiments and in tables 1 and 2 we summarize their results.
MNIST: We train two convolutional neural networks based on architectures that appear in Madry
et al. (2018) and Trame`r et al. (2018) respectively. The network MNIST-A consists of two convo-
lutional layers of sizes 32 × 5 × 5 and 64 × 5 × 5, each followed by 2 × 2 max-pooling and a
rectifier activation function, a fully connected layer into dimension 1024 with a rectifier activation
function, and a final linear layer with output dimension 10. The network MNIST-B consists of two
convolutional layers of sizes 128× 3× 3 and 64× 3× 3 with a rectifier activation function, a fully
connected layer into dimension 128 with a rectifier activation function, and a final linear layer with
output dimension 10. During training, the latter convolutional layer and the former fully connected
layer of MNIST-B are subject to dropout of drop probabilities 1/4 and 1/2. We use ADef to produce
adversarial deformations of the images in the test set. The algorithm is configured to pursue any la-
bel different from the correct label (all incorrect labels are candidate labels). It performs smoothing
by a Gaussian filter of standard deviation 1/2, uses bilinear interpolation to obtain intermediate pixel
intensities, and it overshoots by η = 2/10 whenever it converges to a decision boundary.
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Table 1: The results of applying ADef to the images in the MNIST test set and the ILSVRC2012
validation set. The accuracy of the Inception and ResNet models is defined as the top-1 accuracy on
the center-cropped and resized images. The success rate of ADef is shown as a percentage of the
correctly classified inputs. The pixel range is scaled to [0, 1], so the perturbation r = y−x, where x
is the input and y the output of ADef, has values in [−1, 1]. The averages in the three last columns
are computed over the set of images on which ADef is successful. Recall the definition of the vector
field norm in equation (3).
Model Accuracy ADef success Avg. ‖τ∗‖T Avg. ‖r‖∞ Avg. # iterations
MNIST-A 98.99% 99.85% 1.1950 0.7455 7.002
MNIST-B 98.91% 99.51% 1.0841 0.7654 4.422
Inception-v3 77.56% 98.94% 0.5984 0.2039 4.050
ResNet-101 76.97% 99.78% 0.5561 0.1882 4.176
Original: orangutan Deformed: chimpanzee
T : 0.395
Vector field
`∞: 0.121
Perturbation Close-up
Original: orangutan Deformed: chimpanzee
T : 1.273
Vector field
`∞: 0.276
Perturbation Close-up
Figure 2: Sample deformations for the Inception-v3 model. The vector fields and perturbations
have been amplified for visualization. First row: An image from the ILSVRC2012 validation set,
the output of ADef with a Gaussian filter of standard deviation 1, the corresponding vector field
and perturbation. The rightmost image is a close-up of the vector field around the nose of the ape.
Second row: A larger deformation of the same image, obtained by using a wider Gaussian filter
(standard deviation 6) for smoothing.
ImageNet: We apply ADef to pretrained Inception-v3 (Szegedy et al., 2016) and ResNet-101 (He
et al., 2016) models to generate adversarial deformations for the images in the ILSVRC2012 vali-
dation set. The images are preprocessed by first scaling so that the smaller axis has 299 pixels for
the Inception model and 224 pixels for ResNet, and then they are center-cropped to a square image.
The algorithm is set to focus only on the label of second highest probability. It employs a Gaussian
filter of standard deviation 1, bilinear interpolation, and an overshoot factor η = 1/10.
We only consider inputs that are correctly classified by the model in question, and, since τ∗ =
τ (1)+· · ·+τ (n) approximates the total deforming vector field, we declare ADef to be successful if its
output is misclassified and ‖τ∗‖T ≤ ε, where we choose ε = 3. Observe that, by (3), a deformation
with respect to a vector field τ does not displace any pixel further away from its original position
than ‖τ‖T . Hence, for high resolution images, the choice ε = 3 indeed produces small deformations
if the vector fields are smooth. In appendix A, we illustrate how the success rate of ADef depends
on the choice of ε.
When searching for an adversarial example, one usually searches for a perturbation with `∞-norm
smaller than some small number ε > 0. Common choices of ε range from 1/10 to 3/10 for MNIST
6
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Table 2: Success rates for PGD and ADef attacks on adversarially trained networks.
Model Adv. training Accuracy PGD success ADef success
MNIST-A PGD 98.36% 5.81% 6.67%ADef 98.95% 100.00% 54.16%
MNIST-B PGD 98.74% 5.84% 20.35%ADef 98.79% 100.00% 45.07%
Original
`∞: 0.96
Target: 0
`∞: 0.96
Target: 1
`∞: 0.98
Target: 2
`∞: 0.90
Target: 3
`∞: 0.55
Target: 4
`∞: 0.88
Target: 5
`∞: 1.00
Target: 6
`∞: 0.74
Target: 7
`∞: 0.96
Target: 8
T : 2.37 T : 2.53 T : 1.39 T : 1.34 T : 0.57 T : 1.43 T : 2.30 T : 1.15 T : 2.22
Figure 3: Targeted ADef against MNIST-A. First row: The original image and deformed images
produced by restricting ADef to the target labels 0 to 8. The `∞-norms of the corresponding pertur-
bations are shown under the deformed images. Second row: The vector fields corresponding to the
deformations and their T -norms.
classifiers (Goodfellow et al., 2014; Madry et al., 2018; Wong & Kolter, 2018; Trame`r et al., 2018;
Kannan et al., 2018) and 2/255 to 16/255 for ImageNet classifiers (Goodfellow et al., 2014; Kurakin
et al., 2017a; Trame`r et al., 2018; Kannan et al., 2018). Table 1 shows that on average, the pertur-
bations obtained by ADef are quite large compared to those constraints. However, as can be seen in
figure 2, the relatively high resolution images of the ImageNet dataset can be deformed into adver-
sarial examples that, while corresponding to large perturbations, are not visibly different from the
original images. In appendices B and C, we give more examples of adversarially deformed images.
3.2 ADVERSARIAL TRAINING
In addition to training MNIST-A and MNIST-B on the original MNIST data, we train independent
copies of the networks using the adversarial training procedure described by Madry et al. (2018).
That is, before each step of the training process, the input images are adversarially perturbed us-
ing the PGD algorithm. This manner of training provides increased robustness against adversarial
perturbations of low `∞-norm. Moreover, we train networks using ADef instead of PGD as an ad-
versary. In table 2 we show the results of attacking these adversarially trained networks, using ADef
on the one hand, and PGD on the other. We use the same configuration for ADef as above, and for
PGD we use 40 iterations, step size 1/100 and 3/10 as the maximum `∞-norm of the perturbation. In-
terestingly, using these configurations, the networks trained against PGD attacks are more resistant
to adversarial deformations than those trained against ADef.
3.3 TARGETED ATTACKS
ADef can also be used for targeted adversarial attacks, by restricting the deformed image to have a
particular target label instead of any label which yields the optimal deformation. Figure 3 demon-
strates the effect of choosing different target labels for a given MNIST image, and figure 4 shows
the result of targeting the label of lowest probability for an image from the ImageNet dataset.
7
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Original: fig Deformed: grocery store
T : 0.897
Vector field
`∞: 0.301
Perturbation
Original: fig Deformed: gazelle
T : 2.599
Vector field
`∞: 0.595
Perturbation
Figure 4: Untargeted vs. targeted attack on the ResNet-101 model. An image from the
ILSVRC2012 validation set deformed to the labels of second highest (first row) and lowest (sec-
ond row) probabilities (out of 1,000) for the original image. The vector fields and perturbations have
been amplified for visualization.
4 CONCLUSION
In this work, we proposed a new efficient algorithm, ADef, to construct a new type of adversarial
attacks for DNN image classifiers. The procedure is iterative and in each iteration takes a gradient
descent step to deform the previous iterate in order to push to a decision boundary.
We demonstrated that with almost imperceptible deformations, state-of-the art classifiers can be
fooled to misclassify with a high success rate of ADef. This suggests that networks are vulnerable
to different types of attacks and that simply training the network on a specific class of adversarial
examples might not form a sufficient defense strategy. Given this vulnerability of neural networks
to deformations, we wish to study in future work how ADef can help for designing possible defense
strategies. Furthermore, we also showed initial results on fooling adversarially trained networks.
Remarkably, PGD trained networks on MNIST are more resistant to adversarial deformations than
ADef trained networks. However, for this result to be more conclusive, similar tests on ImageNet
will have to be conducted. We wish to study this in future work.
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Figure 5: The (normalized) distribution of ‖τ∗‖T from the MNIST experiments. Deformations that
fall to the left of the vertical line at ε = 3 are considered successful. The networks in the first column
were trained using the original MNIST data, and the networks in the second and third columns were
adversarially trained using ADef and PGD, respectively.
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Figure 6: The (normalized) distribution of ‖τ∗‖T from the ImageNet experiments. Deformations
that fall to the left of the vertical line at ε = 3 are considered successful.
A DISTRIBUTION OF VECTOR FIELD NORMS
Figures 5 and 6 show the distribution of the norms of the total deforming vector fields, τ∗, from the
experiments in section 3. For networks that have not been adversarially trained, most deformations
fall well below the threshold of  = 3. Out of the adversarially trained networks, only MNIST-A
trained against PGD is truly robust against ADef. Further, a comparison between the first column of
figure 5 and figure 6 indicates that ImageNet is much more vulnerable to adversarial deformations
than MNIST, also considering the much higher resolution of the images in ImageNet. Thus, it
would be very interesting to study the performance of ADef with adversarially trained network for
ImageNet, as mentioned in the Conclusion.
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Table 3: The results of applying ADef to the images in the ILSVRC2012 validation set and the
Inception model, using different values for the standard deviation σ of the Gaussian filter. As before,
we define ADef to be successful if ‖τ∗‖T ≤ 3.
σ ADef success Avg. ‖τ∗‖T Avg. ‖r‖∞ Avg. # iterations
0 99.12% 0.5272 0.1628 5.247
1 98.94% 0.5984 0.2039 4.050
2 95.91% 0.7685 0.2573 3.963
4 86.66% 0.9632 0.3128 4.379
8 67.54% 1.1684 0.3687 5.476
B SMOOTH DEFORMATIONS
The standard deviation of the Gaussian filter used for smoothing in the update step of ADef has
significant impact on the resulting vector field. To explore this aspect of the algorithm, we repeat
the experiment from section 3 on the Inception-v3 model, using standard deviations σ = 0, 1, 2, 4, 8
(where σ = 0 stands for no smoothing). The results are shown in table 3, and the effect of varying
σ is illustrated in figures 7 and 8. We observe that as σ increases, the adversarial distortion steadily
increases both in terms of vector field norm and perturbation norm. Likewise, the success rate of
ADef decreases with larger σ. However, from figure 8 we see that the constraint ‖τ∗‖T ≤ 3 on the
total vector field may provide a rather conservative measure of the effectiveness of ADef in the case
of smooth high dimensional vector fields.
C ADDITIONAL DEFORMED IMAGES
C.1 MNIST
Figures 9 and 10 show adversarial deformations for the models MNIST-A and MNIST-B, respec-
tively. The attacks are performed using the same configuration as in the experiments in section 3.
Observe that in some cases, features resembling the target class have appeared in the deformed im-
age. For example, the top part of the 4 in the fifth column of figure 10 has been curved slightly to
more resemble a 9.
C.2 IMAGENET
Figures 11 – 15 show additional deformed images resulting from attacking the Inception-v3 model
using the same configuration as in the experiments in section 3. Similarly, figures 16 – 20 show
deformed images resulting from attacking the ResNet-10 model. However, in order to increase
variability in the output labels, we perform a targeted attack, targeting the label of 50th highest
probability.
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Figure 7: The effects of increasing the smoothness parameter σ on adversarial deformations for
Inception-v3. First and fourth rows: A correctly classified image and deformed versions. Second
and fifth rows: The corresponding deforming vector fields and their T -norms. Third and sixth
rows: The corresponding perturbations and their `∞ norms.
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Figure 8: The effects of increasing the smoothness parameter σ on adversarial deformations for
Inception-v3. Note that according to the criterion ‖τ∗‖T ≤ 3, the value σ = 8 yields an unsuccessful
deformation of the recreational vehicle.
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Figure 9: Adversarial deformations for MNIST-A. First and third rows: Original images from the
MNIST test set. Second and fourth rows: The deformed images and the norms of the correspond-
ing deforming vector fields.
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Figure 10: Adversarial deformations for MNIST-B. Note that image 9 in row 3 is misclassified, and
is then deformed to its correct label.
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Figure 11: ADef attacks on the Inception-v3 model using the same configuration as in the experi-
ments in section 3.
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Figure 12: ADef attacks on the Inception-v3 model using the same configuration as in the experi-
ments in section 3.
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Figure 13: ADef attacks on the Inception-v3 model using the same configuration as in the experi-
ments in section 3.
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Figure 14: ADef attacks on the Inception-v3 model using the same configuration as in the experi-
ments in section 3.
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Figure 15: ADef attacks on the Inception-v3 model using the same configuration as in the experi-
ments in section 3.
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Figure 16: ADef attacks on the ResNet-101 model targeting the 50th most likely label.
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Figure 17: ADef attacks on the ResNet-101 model targeting the 50th most likely label.
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Figure 18: ADef attacks on the ResNet-101 model targeting the 50th most likely label.
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Figure 19: ADef attacks on the ResNet-101 model targeting the 50th most likely label.
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Figure 20: ADef attacks on the ResNet-101 model targeting the 50th most likely label.
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